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ABSTRACT
HE SAID, SHE SAID: INVESTOR REACTIONS TO CEO GENDER AND EARNINGS
GUIDANCE DISCLOSURE IN THE PRESENCE OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM

MAY 2021

SCOTT C. JACKSON, B.S., BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY
M.ACC., BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Co-Directed by: Professor Christopher P. Agoglia and M. David Piercey

This study addresses concerns from the SEC and examines the trend of shareholder activism and
its impact on financial players. Specifically, I examine how the nature of the shareholder
activism (Profitability-focused versus Environmental/Social-focused) interacts with CEO gender
to create perceptions of match or mismatch within nonprofessional investors, in terms of
perceived ability to address the shareholder activism. Drawing on role-congruity theory, I predict
and find that when a perceived match exists, investment willingness is increased, with the
greatest differences occurring when the CEO does not disclose earnings guidance information.
Given recent trends that show increased disclosure of earnings guidance in companies threatened
by shareholder activism, I examine how this type of disclosure impacts investor judgments. I find
that when managers’ optimistic forecasts differ from consensus analyst estimates, this creates an
incongruent message and attenuates the heuristic processing associated with the perceived CEO
gender-activism match. Additionally, I find evidence that earnings guidance disclosure has a
stronger impact on perceptions of female CEOs than male CEOs. Finally, I find that this effect is
seen under various types of forecasts (point and range), suggesting that both types of forecasts
are capable of acting as incongruent messages to motivate systematic processing.

Keywords: shareholder activism; earnings guidance; CEO gender; role congruity; forecast form
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Shareholder activism occurs when a shareholder uses his or her rights as a partial owner
to bring about change within or for the corporation and is a phenomenon that is becoming more
commonplace within financial markets. From 2013 to 2018, shareholder activists targeted over
4,600 firms worldwide, with female CEOs being targeted more often than male CEOs (Schulte
Roth and Zabel, 2019; Gupta et al., 2018). The nature of these demands may vary between a
more traditional, profit-driven focus, to a more environmental and/or social (“E&S”) focus
(Losasso and Dellecker, 2018; Westcott, 2019). Recent empirical research finds that when
companies are faced with the threat of shareholder activism, managers are more likely to
voluntarily disclose earnings guidance (Bourveau and Schoenfield, 2017). As such, regulators
have expressed concern about the power these shareholder activists wield, and their impact on
financial markets, corporate governance, and regulation (Jackson, 2018; Bogle, 2018). Informed
by role congruity theory, my study examines whether other non-professional investors
heuristically rely on the nature of the activism and the gender of the CEO to form perceptions of
match or mismatch for which they then base investment decisions. I define a match when the
gender expectations of the CEO and the nature of the activism align (Agentic: male CEO and
Profitability-focused activism; Communal: female CEO and E&S-focused activism), and a
mismatch all else. Additionally, I examine whether this effect is magnified or attenuated when
managers disclose various types of earnings guidance that conflicts with (and is more optimistic
than) a consensus analyst estimate.

1

Shareholder activism is becoming increasingly influential on the operational decision
making of companies, with many studies pointing to increased financial performance as a result
(Brav et al., 2008; Klein and Zur, 2009; Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang, 2015). However, there exist
various motives behind shareholder activism, from simply trying to improve corporate
governance by increasing efficiencies and dropping unprofitable segments, to trying to improve
its reputation by making a company’s practices more ethically and ecologically sound, from an
environmental or social perspective (Losasso and Dellecker, 2018). This latter type of activism
has recently garnered support from large hedge funds and accounted for a majority of all
shareholder proposals filed for the years 2017-2019 (Losasso and Dellecker, 2018; Westcott,
2019). Typically, prior studies looking at shareholder activism have not differentiated between
these two different types of activism, which highlights the importance of this study, to the extent
that investors react differently to different types of activism, depending on the gender of the
CEO. These global economic trends motivate the study of investor reactions to different types of
shareholder activism.
Additionally, there is growing interest in the accounting literature surrounding the effects
of gender, wherein stereotypical behavior and discrimination potentially exists (Friedman, 2019).
One study finds that when female Certified Financial Analysts exhibit stereotypically feminine
behavior, they are more likely to be categorized as “female”, and less likely to be categorized as
CFA, which leads to decreased evaluations, whereas the corresponding recategorization does not
occur for male CFAs (Bloomfield et al., 2021). Additionally, concurrent research finds that more
narcissistic women are less likely to be recruited to public accounting firms compared to less
narcissistic women, but ironically are the candidates possessing the self-promotion behavior
necessary to be promoted through the ranks of the firm (Fanning, Williams, and Williamson,
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2021). These findings are consistent with psychology research that finds that female leaders are
disadvantaged because of the perceived mismatch between the agentic and “masculine” traits
ascribed to the prototypical leader and the communal and “feminine” traits associated with the
female gender (Eagly and Karau, 1991, 2002; Eagly, Karau, and Makhijani, 1995; Eagly,
Makhijani, and Klonsky, 1992; Heilman, 2001; Heilman and Okimoto, 2007). However, other
studies suggest that, in certain settings, female leaders may be viewed more favorably than their
male counterparts, particularly when cooperation, collaboration, and mentoring are required
(Rosette and Tost, 2010; Eagly, 2007; Eagly and Carli, 2003; Vecchio, 2002, 2003). This study
contributes to this growing literature by investigating a situation in which communal, feminine
traits could be valued over male, agentic behavior, specifically when they are viewed as
possessing traits that are appropriate to respond to an external force (e.g., shareholder activism).
Drawing on role congruity theory, I predict that investors will perceive matches or
mismatches between the CEO and the activism, based on assessments of agentic or communal
traits stemming from the CEO’s gender. Specifically, I predict that investors will perceive the
agentic qualities associated with male CEOs to be more of a match with the agentic nature of
profitability-focused activism. Additionally, I predict that investors will perceive the communal
qualities associated with female CEOs to be more of a match with the communal nature of E&Sfocused activism. I predict that investors will rely on this heuristic when determining their
willingness to invest in a company being targeted by shareholder activism, particularly when the
underlying situation is ambiguous (e.g., absent earnings guidance disclosure).
Concurrent research shows that shareholder activists can shape a firm’s information
environment and motivate a targeted company to increase voluntary disclosure (McDonough and
Schoenfeld, 2021). This is consistent with prior literature showing that when the threat of
3

shareholder activism exists, managers will increase voluntary disclosure in the form of earnings
guidance, with this guidance becoming more positive and more precise (Bourveau and
Schoenfield, 2017). Additionally, recent experimental research shows that in the face of
criticism, there are benefits to redirecting attention to positive information (Cade, 2018). I predict
two alternative hypotheses with regard to investor reactions to positive earnings guidance
disclosure in the presence of activism. On the one hand, earnings guidance disclosure has the
potential to increase the information set available to the market. However, when management’s
estimate conflicts with estimates provided by external parties (e.g., analysts), this could create
incongruent messaging for investors, where the consensus analyst forecast is saying one thing
and management is saying another. Under this scenario, I predict that the incongruent messaging
would lead to a decrease in heuristic processing and an attenuation of the gender-activism
heuristic predicted in the absence of earnings guidance disclosure. On the other hand, investors
may rely on their perceptions of match or mismatch to attribute the disclosure to either
dispositional factors (e.g., CEO credibility) or situational factors (e.g., shareholder activism),
leading to higher perceptions of credibility when CEOs “match” the activism (Ross 1977). This
alternative prediction suggests a magnification of the gender-activism heuristic predicted in the
absence of earnings guidance disclosure. I test both predictions, under disclosures of both point
and range forecasts.
To test my predictions, I run a 2×2×3 full-factorial between-participants experiment. I
manipulate the nature of the shareholder activism at two levels (Profitability-focused versus
E&S-focused) and the CEO gender at two levels (Male versus Female). I also manipulate the
disclosure of earnings guidance at three levels (Point versus Range versus None), which is
included in a voluntary disclosure from the CEO issued in response to the shareholder activism.
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As my main dependent variable, I measure participants’ investment willingness, which is the
average of two factors: investment attractiveness and investment likelihood (Elliott, Rennekamp,
and White, 2015)
Consistent with my first hypothesis, I find that when earnings guidance disclosure is
absent, investors show increased investment willingness for a male CEO, compared to a female
CEO, when the activism is profitability focused. Under E&S-focused activism, investors behave
the exact opposite way, where investors show increased investment willingness for a female
CEO, compared to a male CEO. Additionally, I find that these differences are diminished in the
presence of earnings guidance disclosure, consistent with the prediction that when managers’
estimates are incongruent with a consensus analyst estimate, this will result in an attenuation of
the gender-activism heuristic that is evident in the absence of earnings guidance disclosure. I also
investigate potential effects of earnings guidance precision but find that range estimates are
viewed no differently than point estimates, consistent with some prior research (Hirst, Koonce,
and Miller, 1999). This suggests that the disclosure of both point and range estimates can serve
as incongruent messages with the consensus analyst estimate.
Although shareholder activists hold small non-controlling interests, their activism is
playing a larger role in operational decisions than ever before and research has been relatively
silent on the impact of activism on other investors. This study addresses some of the SEC’s
concerns regarding the effect of shareholder activism on other financial players (Jackson, 2018)
and does so by differentiating the potential effects of profitability-focused and E&S focused
activism on non-professional investors. My study focuses on the judgments and decisions of
nonprofessional investors for two main reasons. First, shareholder activists tend to magnify their
influence through extensive financial media coverage, where their influence is felt indirectly
5

through the channels in which nonprofessional investors gather information (Losasso and
Dellecker, 2018; Solomon, Soltis, and Sosyura, 2014). Second, as part of its mission, the SEC
specifically expresses concern about protecting small retail investors (Jackson, 2018; SEC 2020).
Thus, the influence of shareholder activism on these types of investors should be of interest to
regulatory bodies.
This study also adds to the emerging stream of literature investigating gender differences
in accounting settings (Fanning et al., 2021; Bloomfield et al., 2021; Friedman, 2019; Cook et
al., 2020). Specifically, this study illustrates a specific scenario in which communal, feminine
traits would be valued over male, agentic traits. While the interaction of shareholder activism and
CEO gender is the specific match/mismatch setting chosen for this study, I would expect these
findings to apply to other situations in which a match or mismatch between the manager and an
external stimulus is perceived. Finally, this study builds on the literature examining deviations
between management and consensus analyst estimates (Kothari, 2001; Feng and McVay 2010;
Louis, Sun, and Urcan, 2013). Specifically, I find evidence consistent with a decrease in heuristic
processing when these forecasts are incongruent, offering a behavioral explanation for the
empirical finding that these deviations add value-relevant information for investors (Louis et al.,
2013). As such, I identify incongruent messaging associated with earnings guidance forecasts as
a relatively subtle motivation for investors to engage in effortful processing and avoid genderbased heuristic processing (c.f., Koch, D’Mello, and Sackett, 2015).
The remainder of this paper is outlined as follows. Chapter two provides some
background as well as the theoretical framework behind my hypotheses and chapter three
describes the research design. Chapter four discusses statistical tests and chapter five concludes.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
2.1.Shareholder Activism
One of the primary missions of the Securities and Exchange Commission is to protect
Main Street investors who rely on financial markets (SEC, 2020). Shareholder activism is
becoming more commonplace within financial markets, leading regulators to express concern
about the power these shareholder activists wield, and their impact on financial markets,
corporate governance, and regulation (Jackson, 2018; Bogle, 2018). Recent research suggests
that activism is on the rise, and a large empirical literature on the subject has emerged (see Brav
et al., 2015, for a review). Between 2017 and 2020, shareholder activists launched over 2,800
campaigns worldwide, with twenty percent either being successful or ending in settlement with
the targeted company (Mahabier and Atteh, 2020).1
Traditional, profitability-focused shareholder activism targets poorly performing firms in
a fund’s portfolio, and involves pressuring management for improved performance, with the end
goal being to enhance shareholder value (Bethel, Liebeskind, and Opler, 1998; Gillan and Starks,
2000). This type of activism advocates changes to operations and is intended to create gains
within the company, cut waste, and increase efficiencies and profitability. Indeed, recent research
finds that the presence of shareholder activism often leads to changes in boards and audit
committees (Adams and Neururer, 2020; Gow, Shin, and Srinivasan, 2016). Traditional activism
often favors short-term profits to long-term success (e.g., cutting R&D, investments) and tends to
have a negative impact on sustainability and diversity initiatives (Losasso and Dellecker, 2018).
Despite this, it generally leads to improved financial performance and, as a result, the market

1

See Appendix A for quotes and examples.
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response is typically positive following the announcement of a traditional, profitability-focused
shareholder activism campaign (Brav et al., 2008; Klein and Zur, 2009; Bebchuk et al., 2015).
However, not all shareholder activism campaigns are successful, and can sometimes even cause
companies to fail (Surowiecki, 2013). This typically happens when restructuring efforts demand
industry-specific knowledge that many money managers do not have.
Contrasted with this is environmental and social (“E&S”) focused shareholder activism,
which typically focuses on company policies surrounding environmental and social
responsibility issues (Grewal, Serafeim, and Yoon, 2016; Mohammed, 2018; Dimson, Karakas,
and Li, 2015). Importantly, activism on E&S issues may or may not immediately lead to
improved performance and positive stock reactions (Dimson et al., 2015; Grewal et al., 2016).
This is consistent with recent experimental research that finds differential reactions to positive
corporate social responsibility performance (Guiral et al., 2019). However, many activist
investors view E&S-focused activism as equally (if not more) important for the bottom line as
profitability-focused activism, just with a longer time horizon.2 As such, sustainability proposals
have become successful at garnering majority shareholder support in recent years. Starting in
2017, even large asset managers (e.g., BlackRock, Vanguard, Fidelity, and American Funds)
have started voting for climate-related shareholder proposals, which has contributed to increased
levels of support among other shareholders (Losasso and Dellecker, 2018). For the years 20172019, this type of activism accounted for a majority of all shareholder proposals filed, outpacing
those related to governance and compensation (Westcott, 2019).

2

Nell Minnow, Vice President of ValueEdge Advisors and activist investor, is quoted regarding the importance of
E&S-related activities: “Even if you think that fossil fuels are the greatest thing in the world, you’re not making any
more of it. So, what is your plan going forward?” (Losasso and Dellecker, 2018).

8

Shareholder activism differs from a hostile takeover bid. Shareholder activists typically
do not buy up controlling interest in a company, but rather the percentage of ownership typically
stays between 1 and 5 percent (Brav et al., 2008). Activists instead magnify their influence
through other channels, namely extensive financial media coverage and reliance on their
influence as large institutional investors (Losasso and Dellecker, 2018). Thus, their influence is
felt more indirectly than directly, with the potential to impact other players in the financial
market, namely nonprofessional investors, whom regulators are concerned about protecting. This
effect of activism on nonprofessional investors will be especially pronounced given that the
channels that shareholder activists use to pressure management are often the same channels
through which these investors gather much of their information about potential investments
(Solomon, Soltes, and Sosyura, 2014).3 Thus, while shareholder activists typically target
company leadership (and not other investors), any residual effect on other investors’ judgments
represents an indirect effect of shareholder activism, which becomes the setting for my study.
2.2. Nature of Activism and CEO Match/Mismatch
As discussed above, the nature of shareholder activism can differ between traditional,
profitability-focused activism, to activism dealing mainly with E&S-related activities. The
environmental uncertainty surrounding shareholder activism likely leads investors to evaluate
characteristics of the CEO and assess the perceived appropriateness in addressing the activism
(Waldman et al., 2001). One particularly salient characteristic of the CEO is gender, which is
particularly important in light of recent research that finds female CEOs are significantly more
likely to be targeted by shareholder activists, compared to male CEOs (Gupta et al. 2018; Francis
One recent example is the “Fearless Girl Campaign” enacted by State Street Global Advisors, in which the fund
issued a press release publicly calling on the companies in its portfolio to increase the gender diversity of their
boards. This was accompanied with placing a statue of a girl standing in front of the famous Charging Bull near
Wall Street.
3
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et al. 2021).4 Francis et al. (2021) suggest that this is because female CEOs are more likely to be
perceived as communal and collaborative, and thus easier targets for accomplishing activists’
goals.
Shareholder activists hold a lot of power, especially given the large block of shares they
typically hold (typically between 1 and 5 percent) and the power they wield with the financial
media. If other investors feel like the CEO is incapable of addressing the demands put forth by
activist investors, they are likely to show a decrease in investment willingness. On the other
hand, companies can spin meeting demands from activists in a positive light (e.g., “We increased
EPS; are a more sustainable company”), which can improve stock performance. Thus,
investment willingness likely depends on the investor’s perceptions of the CEO’s ability to
address the activism. I look to role congruity theory to predict whether investors would be more
willing to invest in a company facing activism when there is a match between the CEO compared
to when there is a mismatch.
Role congruity theory suggests that a group will be positively evaluated when its
characteristics are perceived to be aligned with its typical social roles (Eagly and Diekman,
2005; Okimoto and Brescoll, 2010). Gender impacts expectations surrounding behavior, wherein
males have an expectation of being more aggressive, assertive, independent, self-confident,
influential (Eagly and Johannesen-Schmidt, 2001; Brescoll, 2016). These qualities together
describe “agentic” behavior. Traditional profitability-focused shareholder activism involves

Both Gupta et al. (2018) and Francis et al. (2021) are motivated from the “glass-cliff” literature (i.e., women are
more likely to be appointed leaders when firms are performing poorly). To the extent that this an actual practice, it
represents an endogeneity concern that investors seeing a female CEO may perceive the company to be a worse
performer, compared to when the CEO is male. However, the literature is mixed on this phenomenon (Ryan et al.
2016). In additional analyses, Gupta et al. (2018) find that prior year ROA is not related to whether a female is
appointed CEO. Francis et al. (2021) continues to observe gender-related targeting from activists when controlling
for pretransition performance.
4
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cutting waste and increasing profitability. Therefore, investors are likely to perceive that
addressing this type of activism requires decisive, aggressive, and assertive actions on the part of
the CEO, which would lead to expectations that the CEO should be more agentic in nature.
Agentic characteristics that are perceived with male CEOs are likely to be viewed as being in
close alignment with the agentic goals surrounding the more profitability-focused shareholder
activism (i.e., increasing earnings per share through cutting investments, decreasing excessive
executive compensation, repurchasing outstanding shares), with a perceived match leading to a
positive heuristic reaction, in terms of increased investment willingness compared to when a
match does not exist (under a female CEO).
On the other hand, E&S-focused shareholder activism, given its focus on ethics and
environmental/social responsibility, concerns itself with the welfare of others, making it more
communal in nature, and is potentially perceived as requiring a CEO that is conscientious of the
needs of others when responding to the activism. Communal qualities include kindness,
sympathy, sensitivity, passivity, and nurturance, and having an overall concern for the welfare of
others (Eagly and Johannessen-Schmidt, 2001). There exists a stereotypical expectation that
females are more communal than males (Eagly and Johannessen-Schmidt, 2001). Role congruity
theory suggests that the characteristics that are stereotypically perceived with female CEOs are
likely to be viewed as more aligned with the communal goals surrounding the E&S-focused
shareholder activism (e.g., having a gender diverse board, communal practices with environment
and employees, supporting fair and humane working conditions in suppliers). As such, a match
between a female CEO and E&S-focused activism is likely to result in a positive heuristic
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reaction leading to increased investment willingness, compared to when such a match does not
exist (under a male CEO).5
Taken together, in the presence of shareholder activism, investors are likely to assess the
characteristics of upper management and determine whether they have the capacity to address
the demands set forth by the activist. This assessment will lead to certain CEO characteristics
becoming more salient and relevant (including gender). Gender stereotypes tend to have greater
influence on judgments in ambiguous situations, where investors will link a manager’s
characteristics and decisions with firm outcomes (Heilman and Parks-Stamm, 2007). In the
absence of earnings guidance disclosure, ambiguity surrounding the effects of the shareholder
activism on the company would be greatest, which leads me to predict that investors would be
susceptible to the pervasive bias associated with gender role stereotypes. This will lead to
perceptions of match or mismatch; wherein male CEOs are seen as more of a match with
profitability-focused activism and female CEOs are seen as more of a match with E&S-focused
activism. I predict that investors will likely rely on this heuristic when determining their
willingness to invest in a company being targeted by shareholder activism. Stated formally:
H1a: Under profitability-focused shareholder activism, investment willingness will be higher for
a male compared to a female CEO, absent earnings guidance disclosure.
H1b: Under E&S-focused shareholder activism, investment willingness will be higher for a
female compared to a male CEO, absent earnings guidance disclosure.

Importantly, my study focuses on non-professional investors’ expectations of fit stemming from CEO gender. As
such I remain agnostic as to whether a male or female CEO would in actuality be better able to address profitability
or E&S related shareholder activism. In fact, prior research suggests that although people tend to expect stark
differences between males and females with respect to agentic or communal traits, implicit variations tend to be
much smaller (Vianello et al., 2013).
5
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2.3. Disclosure
Recent activism research shows that shareholder activists can shape a firm’s information
environment and motivate a targeted company to increase voluntary disclosure (McDonough and
Schoenfeld, 2021). This is consistent with previous research that has found when managers feel
the threat of shareholder activism, they tend to disclose earnings guidance more frequently, with
these disclosures becoming slightly more optimistic and precise (Bourveau and Schoenfield,
2017). This increased disclosure may serve to reduce information asymmetries in the market,
improve the relationship with existing shareholders, enhance/signal management’s credibility
and reputation, or deter potential litigation from activists related to nondisclosure. This is
particularly pertinent for female CEOs, given the fact that they are more likely to be targeted by
shareholder activists and are more likely to issue earnings guidance forecasts in other high-risk
scenarios (Gupta et al., 2018; Glass and Cook, 2016; Cook et al., 2020). However, investors tend
to view those disclosures as less credible, compared to similar disclosures issued by male CEOs
(Cook et al., 2020). Additionally, recent experimental research shows that in the face of
criticism, there are benefits to redirecting attention toward something positive (Cade, 2018). This
makes the disclosure of positive earnings guidance a particularly relevant area to examine the
impact of shareholder activism and CEO gender. There are at least two potential responses to an
optimistic earnings guidance disclosure, leading to the development of alternative hypotheses,
which I consider below.6

6

The use of multiple competing hypotheses was first introduced by Chamberlin in 1890 and has since become a
powerful tool for scientific investigation, as it tends to mitigate some of the cognitive bias associated with
generating hypotheses (Chamberlin, 1995; Betini, Avgar, and Fryxell, 2017). Its use is commonplace among
archival accounting studies (e.g., Guenther and Trombley, 1994; Zhang, 2007; Badertscher, Collins, and Lys, 2012;
Lewellen and Resutek, 2016; Chu, 2019), as well as some experimental accounting studies (e.g., Frank and
Hoffman, 2014; Bergner, Peffer, and Ramsay, 2016; Simon, Smith, and Zimbelman, 2018).
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2.3.1. Incongruent Messaging
The first potential reaction to earnings guidance disclosure could arise when the forecast
issued by management does not match the forecasts issued by analysts. This would lead to
incongruent messaging, where a consensus analyst forecast is saying one thing and management
is saying another. Management will often issue a lower forecast when they wish to temper
analysts’ expectations, whereas they will issue a higher forecast when they wish to signal
confidence and optimism for the future. The latter situation tends to happen when managers are
faced with the threat of shareholder activism (Bourveau and Schoenfield, 2017). In either case,
unless the forecasts are identical, the forecast issued by management will be perceived to be
incongruent with a consensus analyst forecast.
Importantly for this study, prior research has found that incongruent messaging can
attenuate the tendency to engage in heuristic processing (Maheswaran and Chaiken, 1991;
Todorov, Chaiken, and Henderson, 2002). This is because when there is a motivation to invest
more time in information processing, people tend to pay attention to a wider range of potentially
useful information and engage in deeper processing of the information, which has the potential to
reduce or eliminate the influence of cognitive biases (Kunda, 1990; Lerner and Tetlock, 1999).
This tendency has been shown to decrease gender-based heuristic processing in other settings.
Specifically, decision makers make less biased decisions when they are held accountable for
their decisions, when they believe their decisions have consequences that affect others, or when
they are informed of equity norms (Koch et al., 2015).
As it relates to the gender-activism heuristic (predicted in the absence of earnings
guidance disclosure), the disclosure of incongruent guidance could motivate investors to engage
in systematic processing of the disclosure and attenuate the effect of any heuristic processing
14

(e.g., the gender-activism heuristic that exists absent earnings guidance disclosure).7 This would
be consistent with (and offer a potential behavioral explanation for) recent archival research that
finds value-relevant information in analysts’ deviations from management guidance (Louis et al.,
2013). Stated formally:
H2a: In the presence of earnings guidance disclosure, differences in investment willingness due
to CEO gender will diminish (for both profitability-focused and E&S-focused activism),
compared to when earnings guidance disclosure is absent.
2.3.2. Attribution
The second potential reaction to earnings guidance disclosure could result due to
increased attributions of credibility, particularly when a perceived gender-activism match exists.
As discussed previously, when managers feel the threat of shareholder activism, they tend to
disclose earnings guidance more frequently, with these disclosures becoming slightly more
optimistic and precise (Bourveau and Schoenfield, 2017). One potential reason for this increased
guidance is an effort by management to signal their credibility and reputation to the market to
stave off the shareholder activism. Indeed, prior experimental research has found that increased
forthcomingness of a disclosure increases perceptions of manager credibility, at least in the short
term (Mercer, 2005). However, the effect of disclosure on perceptions of credibility could be
impacted when there is a salient external source to which investors can attribute the increased
disclosure (e.g., shareholder activism).
The Fundamental Attribution Error suggests that people tend to attribute behavior to
dispositional factors, rather than considering external, situational factors (Ross, 1977). It is

Ultimately, any disclosure given is intended for all of a company’s investors and not just the activist shareholders.
Given the potential financial cost associated with a commitment to E&S activities, it would not be unexpected for a
CEO to include an earnings guidance figure in such a disclosure. Additionally, from a theoretical perspective, the
testing of the incongruent messaging hypothesis requires the comparison of two separate messages (i.e., forecasts).
Given the tendency for managers and analysts to issue separate earnings guidance figures, this increases the
likelihood that incongruent messaging will occur.
7
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possible that this tendency is more likely to occur when the perceived characteristics of the CEO
(e.g., communal versus agentic) match the nature of the activism. Under those conditions,
investors would be less likely to consider situational factors when CEOs increase disclosure, but
instead attribute increased disclosure to dispositional factors (e.g., CEO credibility), which
would lead to higher perceptions of credibility when CEOs “match” the activism. This would be
consistent with results found in Mercer (2005), which finds that increased disclosure increases
perceptions of CEO credibility. On the other hand, when a “mismatch” occurs, it is possible that
investors would be more likely to consider situational factors when CEOs increase disclosure
and be more likely to attribute increased disclosure to these factors (e.g., shareholder activism),
which would lead to lower perceptions of credibility when CEOs do not match with the activism.
Thus, the disclosure of earnings guidance would lead to a magnification of the gender-activism
heuristic that exists in the absence of earnings guidance disclosure (through perceptions of
manager credibility), to the extent that incongruent messaging does not attenuate heuristic
processing. Stated formally:
H2b: In the presence of earnings guidance disclosure, differences in investment willingness due
to CEO gender will be larger (for both profitability-focused and E&S-focused activism),
compared to when earnings guidance disclosure is absent.
2.4. Precision of Disclosure
Recent trends in shareholder activism and the relative impact on voluntary disclosure
make it an interesting setting to examine the differential effects of earnings guidance precision
on investor judgments. Managers have discretion when it comes to the precision of the forecast,
which is evidenced through the sizeable amount of variation seen in the characteristics of
earnings guidance (King, Pownall, and Waymire, 1990). Forecasts can take the form of
numerical point, range, minimum or maximum estimates, with most companies reporting either
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point or range forecasts (Baginski, Hassell, and Kimbrough, 2004; Hutton, Miller, and Skinner,
2003). There are mixed findings with regard to the effect of earnings guidance precision on
investor judgments, which has led to calls to study the interaction among antecedents,
characteristics, and consequences of forecast form in order to establish potential boundary
conditions (Hirst, Koonce, and Venkataraman, 2008; Du, 2009; Du and Budescu, 2005; Han and
Tan, 2007; Han and Tan, 2010).
Early analytical research deduced that the stock price change at the time of an
announcement was shown to be a function of the relative importance of the information, with
this effect decreasing as the precision of preannouncement information increased (Kim and
Verrecchia, 1991). Baginski, Conrad, and Hassell (1993) test this theory and finds that more
precise forecasts are more informative compared to other less precise types of forecasts. In a
more recent study, more precise forecasts lead to a greater revision of security prices and
financial analyst consensus earnings-per-share forecasts (Baginski, Hassell, and Wieland, 2011).
However, other studies find no significant effect of forecast form on the stock-price reaction
(Pownall, Wasley, and Waymire, 1993; Atiase et al., 2005). Recent experimental research
suggests that investors’ expectations surrounding the forecast play an important role in the
reaction to different forecast forms. Specifically, investors prefer point estimates when the
environment is more certain, and range estimates when the environment is more uncertain
(Rupar, 2017; Du et al., 2011). The effect of disclosure precision is likely impacted depending on
whether disclosure attenuates (consistent with the incongruent messaging theory) or magnifies
(consistent with the attribution theory) the gender-activism heuristic. I discuss both alternatives
below.
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2.4.1. Incongruent Messaging – Precision of Disclosure
Under the incongruent messaging hypothesis, it is possible that managers’ use of point or
range disclosure could impact the extent to which they perceive the messaging between forecasts
to be incongruent. For example, point estimates could create strong perceptions of incongruence
with analyst forecasts and attenuate investors’ use of heuristic processing when evaluating a
company facing shareholder activism (when the point estimate differs from a consensus analyst
forecast). A range estimate, however, could potentially contain the analyst forecast, and therefore
be perceived as somewhat more congruent than a point estimate, even if the midpoint of this
range is slightly above or below the consensus analyst forecast. This potentially more congruent
messaging could lead to more heuristic processing of range forecast disclosures, similar to when
no earnings guidance is disclosed. Additionally, prior research shows that ambiguity of a
message is a determinant to heuristic processing (Bohner, Chaiken, and Hunyadi, 1994; Chaiken
and Maheswaren, 1994). Therefore, if a range estimate is perceived as more ambiguous than a
point estimate, this could motivate heuristic processing, with investors relying on the genderactivism match heuristic, similar to when earnings guidance disclosure is absent.
On the other hand, there is evidence to suggest that investors who are provided with a
range estimate are likely to use the midpoint of that range, in which case it would be viewed
similarly to a point estimate (Hirst et al., 1999). This would suggest that even range estimates
whose midpoints differ from consensus analyst forecasts could be perceived as incongruent,
therefore motivating systematic processing.
2.4.2. Attribution – Precision of Disclosure
Under the attribution hypothesis, when a match between the CEO and the activism exists,
perceptions of environmental uncertainty will likely decrease. In other words, perceiving the
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CEO as a match for addressing the shareholder activism should lead to fewer feelings of
uncertainty surrounding the company’s ability to address the activist’s demands. The relatively
lower environmental uncertainty associated with a “matched” CEO could lead to point estimates
being perceived as more appropriate, compared to range estimates (Rupar 2017; Du et al., 2011).
Given the tendency to attribute disclosure to dispositional factors when there is a perceived
match, these perceptions of appropriateness could in turn, impact investors’ perceptions of CEO
credibility, with a “matched” CEO disclosing a point estimate being assessed as more credible
compared that same CEO disclosing a range estimate. The opposite is likely true for when the
CEO is perceived to be less of a match for the activism, which would likely lead to perceptions
of higher environmental uncertainty, wherein range estimates would be viewed as more
appropriate compared to point estimates. Thus, a “mismatched” CEO disclosing a range estimate
would be assessed as more credible compared to that same CEO disclosing a point estimate.
These perceptions of credibility would then influence investment willingness.
Alternatively, it is possible that the gender of the CEO impacts expectations of disclosure
precision, irrespective of the nature of the activism. That is, the stereotypical expectations of
either communal or agentic behavior could impact whether investors expect a more precise
disclosure from sources perceived as stereotypically more agentic (e.g., male CEOs) and a less
precise disclosure from sources perceived to be stereotypically less agentic (e.g., female CEOs).
Given the uncertainty surrounding the effects of disclosure precision, I posit the following
research question:
RQ: What is the effect of earnings guidance forecast precision (point versus range estimate) on
investment willingness in the presence of shareholder activism?
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CHAPTER 3
METHOD
3.1. Participants
I recruited 367 professional MBA students at a large university in the United States as
participants in this study.8 This is consistent with prior research that uses these types of
participants as proxies for reasonably well-informed individual investors (Tan and Yu, 2018;
Tan, Wang, and Yoo, 2019; Jackson, Wang, and Piercey, 2021). These participants had on
average 15.0 years of professional work experience, and had taken 2.46 accounting courses, 1.83
finance courses, and 2.25 economics courses. Eighty percent of participants had prior investment
experience, while 96 percent had either invested, or planned to do so in the future, providing
support that the participants are suitable for the study. Prior investment experience and future
intentions to invest do not significantly impact my findings (all p’s  0.615), similar to prior
research (Fanning, Agoglia, and Piercey 2015; Jackson et al., 2021). Fifty-six percent were
male.9
3.2. Experimental Design
Participants assumed the role of an investor evaluating a company in the
telecommunications industry, after reading some background financial information about the
company, receiving information regarding shareholder activism, and reading the subsequent
disclosure by management. To test my predictions, I run a 2×2×3 full-factorial between-

8

This study and all related pilot studies were approved by the Institutional Review Board for Human Participants
(IRB) at the university at which this study was administered and completed.
9
Given the nature of the manipulation of CEO Gender, it is possible that Participant Gender has an effect on
Investment Willingness. To address this possibility, I first verify that Participant Gender was successfully
randomized and find no differences in proportions across conditions (χ2 = 0.830). Additionally, I find that
Participant Gender does not significantly impact my findings (F = 0.886; p = 0.586). Together, this suggests that (1)
Participant Gender is successfully randomized across conditions, and (2) does not appear to have an effect on
Investment Willingness in this setting.
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participants design.10 I manipulate the nature of the Shareholder Activism at two levels
(Profitability-focused versus E&S-focused), the CEO Gender at two levels (Male versus
Female), and Earnings Guidance Disclosure at three levels (Point versus Range versus None).
3.3. Experimental Task
Participants began the task by assuming the role of a prospective investor assessing a
fictional company (“Zetha Inc.”) as a potential investment. Participants received background
information about the company, as well as its major products and sources of competition. After
this, participants read about the board of directors’ recent appointment of the current CEO, who
was described as having twelve years of executive experience in the industry. This is the first
instance of my manipulation of CEO Gender, which varied whether the CEO was female or
male. To maximize the differences associated with gender, I included a picture of the CEO along
with their introduction as either Deborah (Female) or Peter (Male) Schmidt.11 Additionally, any
discussion of the Male (Female) CEO includes the pronouns “he/him/his” (“she/her/hers”).
Participants then read summary financial information, including the consensus analyst forecast
for the upcoming quarter (8.5 cents). To maximize any effect associated with earnings guidance
disclosure, investors were told that the company typically does not issue its own quarterly
earnings forecast.

10

An experiment is advantageous here because firstly, although it is becoming more common, shareholder activism
is still a relatively infrequent phenomenon. Secondly, there are many fewer female CEOs than male CEOs. In fact,
as of May 2020, there were only 37 female CEOs in the Fortune 500. Together these make my research question
difficult to study using archival methods. Finally, as with most experiments, the benefit of random assignment
allows us to hold all else constant and infer causality.
11
This operational decision increases the salience of the CEO’s gender to participants. It is also consistent with the
practice of companies to include pictures of their CEOs along with firm disclosures (Asay, Libby, and Rennekamp,
2018). The names are chosen based on an analysis from LinkedIn, that finds the most popular first name for male
and female CEOs is Peter and Deborah, respectively (Rogati, 2011). I also pre-tested the pictures to make sure they
differed on communal/agentic qualities, but did not differ with respect to age, credibility, or attractiveness (see
section 4.1.1).
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At this point in the study, I presented participants with information about shareholder
activism, along with the nature of the activists’ demands, and the potential consequences that
could occur if the company failed to fulfill the demands. Specifically, the activist hedge fund
claimed that if the CEO could meet their demands, it could improve public perception of the
company and drive up the share price. The hedge fund warned that they would use any tool
available to guarantee that the CEO takes action to meet their demands, including using proxy
voting power to vote against her/his appointment as CEO, talking negatively about the company
with the media, and even liquifying all of its holdings in the company. Participants were told that
these measures collectively would likely have a negative impact on the share price of Zetha
Inc.12 This is the location of my manipulation of Shareholder Activism, which varied the nature
of the demands of the activist hedge fund between either “increasing total earnings per share”
(Profitability-focused) or “becoming more environmentally and socially conscious” (E&Sfocused). Specifically, the fund lays out three demands within each condition (Profitabilityfocused: (1) Sell off certain slow-growth investment and other assets, (2) decrease excessive
compensation of senior management and board members, and (3) begin program to repurchase
outstanding shares; E&S-focused: (1) Increased use of sustainable manufacturing processes, (2)
increased gender diversity of board members, and (3) exclusive purchasing from suppliers who
ensure safe, fair, and healthy working conditions).13 Appendix C outlines this manipulation.
I then presented participants with a statement issued by management a few days after
receiving the hedge funds’ demands, in which the CEO referenced a plan of action in response to
the activism. Additionally, toward the end of this statement, I reminded participants about the

12

These design features were adapted from real-world activist campaigns.
These types of initiatives are among the most common for each type of activism (Ertimur, Ferri, and Muslu, 2011;
Ferri and Sandino, 2009).
13
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consensus analyst EPS forecast and included my manipulation of Earnings Guidance Disclosure,
in which management either disclosed or did not disclose an earnings guidance figure. This
figure was slightly more optimistic than the consensus analyst forecast but varied in its level of
precision (Point versus Range estimate). Specifically, under Point (Range) Disclosure,
participants saw the following as the last line in the CEO’s statement: “Taking this under
consideration, we are predicting the forecast for third quarter earnings per share to be
approximately 9.5 cents (between 6.5 cents and 12.5 cents).”14 This line was blank when no
earnings guidance was disclosed. A picture of the CEO was included in this disclosure (the same
picture from before), along with the CEO’s name, to reinforce the perception of CEO Gender at
the time participants read the disclosure. After reading through the CEO’s disclosure,
participants are reminded about the consensus analyst estimate. Appendix D outlines this
manipulation.
After reading through the case materials, I asked participants to make certain assessments
of the company. Specifically, for my main dependent variable of Investment Willingness,
participants rated the Attractiveness of an investment in the company, as well as their Likelihood
of Investment in the company (Elliott et al. 2015). The instrument also gathered participants’
perceptions of CEO Credibility (as measured through ratings of Competence and
Trustworthiness) as well as participants’ own estimates regarding future earnings per share
(EPS). Finally, the instrument gathered other various post-experimental questions and
demographic information about the participants.

14

This operational decision was made given the fact that (1) in the presence of shareholder activism increased
disclosure tends to be slightly more positive (Bourveau and Schoenfield, 2017), (2) there are benefits to redirecting
attention to positive information in the face of criticism (Cade 2018), and (3) investors usually view good-news
forecasts with more skepticism than bad ones (Hirst et al., 2008).
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
4.1. Manipulation/Attention Checks
4.1.1. CEO Gender – Pilot Studies
I predict that the Male CEO will be viewed as possessing more agentic characteristics,
compared to the Female CEO, and that the Female CEO will be viewed as possessing more
communal characteristics. To verify that my manipulation of CEO Gender captures this
difference, I run a between-participants pilot study wherein I asked 50 Amazon MTurk
participants (25 per cell) to evaluate the pictures of either the male or female CEO on a number
of dimensions, absent any other information. The use of this out-of-sample study offers
additional support for the theoretical mechanism outlined earlier, reduces the plausibility of
alternative explanations, and avoids the use of obtrusive scale measures contaminating
participants’ responses to my main dependent variable in the main experiment (Asay et al.,
2020).
I measure the perceived Agentic and Communal characteristics of the CEO, using an
adapted scale from prior research (Rosette and Tost, 2010; Abele, 2003; Bakan, 1966; Fiske and
Stevens, 1993). Specifically, I ask participants to assess the CEO on the following Agentic
(Communal) qualities: Confident, Skillful, Competitive, Powerful, and Capable (Warm, GoodNatured, Friendly, Considerate, Caring, and Understanding). All items are measured on a 7point scale with “0” labelled “Not at all” and “6” labelled “Extremely.” Agentic measures are all
correlated and load onto one factor, explaining 76.2 percent of the variance (All Pearson
Correlations > 0.564, p < 0.001, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.919). Therefore, I average the five
measures to capture a single measure of Agenticism. Additionally, Communal measures are all
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correlated and load onto one factor, explaining 83.3 percent of the variance (All Pearson
Correlations > 0.701, p < 0.001, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.960). Therefore, I average these six
measures to capture a single measure of Communality. When testing the effectiveness of the
manipulation of CEO Gender, I find that the Female CEO is evaluated higher in terms of
Communality (4.57 versus 3.93; p = 0.024) 15, and that the Male CEO is evaluated higher in
terms of Agenticism (4.70 versus 4.27; p = 0.064). These results offer support for the successful
manipulation of CEO Gender.
To reduce the plausibility of alternative explanations, I also ask participants to evaluate
the CEO on Credibility, Attractiveness, and Old. Following prior research, I measure Credibility
by asking participants to assess the CEO on two items: Competence and Trustworthiness
(Rennekamp, 2012; Koonce and Lipe, 2010). The two measures are correlated and load onto one
factor, explaining 78.7 percent of the variance (Pearson Correlation = 0.573, p < 0.001,
Cronbach’s alpha = 0.726). Therefore, I average the two measures to capture a single measure of
Credibility. Both Attractiveness and Old are measured as single-item factors. As with the
previous items, all items are measured on 7-point scales with “0” labelled “Not at all” and “10”
labelled “Extremely.” I find evidence that my manipulation of CEO Gender does not impact
other perceptions of the CEO. Specifically, I find no significant differences in Credibility (M:
4.44 versus F: 4.60; p = 0.579), Attractiveness (M: 3.80 versus F: 3.32; p = 0.193) or Old (M:
2.92 versus F: 3.28; p = 0.349). Together, these results show that the manipulation of CEO
Gender effectively manipulates the construct of interest, while holding other perceptions of the
CEOs constant.

15

All p-values are one-tailed unless otherwise specified.
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Additionally, I run a second between-participants pilot study with 59 MBA student
participants. On an eleven-point scale, I ask participants to rate how masculine or feminine the
CEO seems (with “-5” labelled “Feminine”, “+5” labelled “Masculine”, and “0” labelled
“Neither Masculine nor Feminine”) and find that the Male CEO appears significantly more
masculine than the Female CEO (M: 3.03; F: -1.55, p < 0.001). I also ask investors to record
how familiar each CEO seemed, on an eleven-point scale (with “-5” labelled “Very unfamiliar”,
“+5” labelled “Very familiar”, and “0” labelled “Neither Familiar nor Unfamiliar”). I find that
familiarity scores for both the male and female CEO are significantly greater than the midpoint
of five (M: 1.72; F: 2.14, both p’s < 0.001 two-tailed, untabulated). However, neither CEO is
perceived to be more familiar than the other (p = 0.390).
4.1.2. Attention Check
Within the main study, I ask a series of recall questions to verify participants paid
attention to the instrument. Regarding CEO Gender, I find that 98.9 percent of participants
correctly recall the gender of the CEO (as either male or female). Regarding Shareholder
Activism, I find that 90.9 percent of participants correctly recall the nature of the shareholder
activists’ demands (as either increasing total earnings per share (EPS) or becoming more
environmentally and socially conscious). Finally, for conditions that received earnings guidance,
I find that 86.7 percent of participants correctly recall the Earnings Guidance Disclosure as
either a point or range estimate.16 Additionally, I record perceived ambiguity in the forecast, as
The rate of failure does not differ for either condition of CEO Gender (Male: 1/182, Female: 3/181; χ2 = 0.317).
However, regarding Shareholder Activism, I find that participants seeing E&S-focused activism were more likely to
incorrectly recall the nature of the activism (Profitability-focused: 10/176, E&S-focused: 26/155; χ2 = 0.004).
Additionally, within conditions where earnings guidance was disclosed, I find that participants were more likely to
incorrectly recall the precision of the disclosure in the point condition (Point: 29/94, Range: 3/114; χ2 < 0.001). I
also analyzed the data including only participants who correctly answered every attention check question. This
method of exclusion is less equitable to conditions that received earnings guidance given the increased number of
attention check questions and the subsequent increased possibility of failure. However, the results do not change
inferentially.
16
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measured on an 11-point scale, with “0” labelled “extremely low ambiguity” and “10” labelled
“extremely high ambiguity”. I find that participants seeing a Range Disclosure assess the
forecast as significantly more ambiguous as compared to participants seeing a Point Disclosure
(7.44 versus 5.09; p < 0.001). In general, I find evidence that participants paid attention to the
instrument.
4.2. Hypothesis Testing
4.2.1. Test of H1a and H1b
To test my first set of hypotheses, I examine conditions where the ambiguity surrounding
the effect of shareholder activism on the future performance of the company would be the
greatest, and therefore most likely to foster gender-based heuristic processing. Therefore, I limit
my analysis to those conditions where earnings guidance disclosure is absent. H1a states that in
the presence of Profitability-focused Activism, Investment Willingness will be higher in the
presence of a Male CEO than a Female CEO. H1b predicts the opposite effect where, under
E&S-focused Activism, Investment Willingness will be higher in the presence of a Female CEO
than a Male CEO. I ask participants to rate (1) the Attractiveness of an investment in the target
company on a scale from zero to ten (“0” is labeled “Very Unattractive”; “10” is labeled “Very
Attractive”), and (2) their Likelihood of Investment, on a scale from zero to ten (“0” is labeled
“Very Unlikely”; “10” is labeled “Very Likely”). These two measures are highly correlated and
load onto one factor, explaining 91.7 percent of the variance (Pearson Correlation = 0.833, p <
0.001, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.906). I therefore use the average of these two measures to capture
Investment Willingness. Panel A of Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations by
condition.
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In Panel B of Table 1, I run a two-way analysis of variance in which the dependent
variable is Investment Willingness, and the independent variables are CEO Gender (Male versus
Female) and Shareholder Activism (Profitability-focused versus E&S-focused). I present
descriptive statistics and results of this ANOVA and graph the results in Figure 1. Importantly
for this study, I find a significant interaction of CEO Gender × Shareholder Activism (F1,126 =
8.703, p = 0.004 two-tailed), offering initial support for H1a and H1b.
Panel C of Table 1 reports the results the simple effects of CEO Gender under each type
of activism. These simple-effects tests provide additional support for my predictions.
Specifically, for Profitability-focused Activism, Investment Willingness is marginally higher
when there is a Male CEO compared to when there is a Female CEO (4.594 versus 3.850; t =
1.453; p = 0.074). For E&S-focused Activism, Investment Willingness is higher when there is a
Female CEO compared to when there is a Male CEO (5.984 versus 4.591; t = 2.778; p =
0.003).17 These results, together with the significant interaction of CEO Gender × Shareholder
Activism, offer support for H1a and H1b, suggesting the existence of a gender-activism heuristic
when earnings guidance disclosure is absent.
4.2.2. Test of H2a and H2b
H2a and H2b present competing hypotheses regarding the effect of earnings guidance
disclosure on the gender-activism heuristic established in H1a and H1b. To address these
competing hypotheses, I examine the interactive effect of CEO Gender (Male versus Female)
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While not explicitly predicted, I also examine the simple effects of Shareholder Activism under each condition of
CEO Gender, for completeness. For Female CEO, Investment Willingness is higher under E&S-focused Activism
compared to Profitability-focused Activism (p < 0.001, two-tailed, untabulated). For Male CEO, there is no statistical
difference in Investment Willingness between Profitability-focused Activism and E&S-focused Activism (p = 0.995
two-tailed, untabulated). One potential explanation for this finding is the likelihood that female CEOs are more
susceptible to gender-related biases compared to male CEOs (Bloomfield et al. 2021).
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and Shareholder Activism (Profitability-focused versus E&S-focused) with Earnings Guidance
Disclosure (Present versus Absent), collapsing both Point and Range conditions into one
condition of Disclosure Present.18 I present the means and standard deviations for Investment
Willingness in Panel A of Table 2 and graph the results in Figure 2. In Panel B of Table 2, I run a
three-way analysis of variance. I find that the three-way interaction of CEO Gender × Earnings
Guidance Disclosure × Shareholder Activism is significant (F1,359 = 5.025, p = 0.026 two-tailed),
as well as the two-way interaction of CEO Gender × Shareholder Activism (F1,359 = 6.705, p =
0.010 two-tailed). I find that the two-way interaction of Earnings Guidance Disclosure ×
Shareholder Activism is marginally significant (F1,359 = 2.869, p = 0.091 two-tailed).19
H2a states that any effect of a gender-activism heuristic would be attenuated in the
presence of earnings guidance disclosure, whereas H2b states that any effect would be magnified
in the presence of disclosure. Panels C and D of Table 2 report the tests of H2a and H2b.
Specifically, I run two-way analyses of variance for participants either seeing Profitabilityfocused or E&S-focused Activism in which the dependent variable is Investment Willingness, and
the independent variables are CEO Gender (Male versus Female) and Earnings Guidance
Disclosure (Present versus Absent). While I do not find a significant interaction of CEO Gender
× Earnings Guidance Disclosure under Profitability-focused Activism (F1,355 = 1.059, p = 0.301
two-tailed), I do find that the simple effect of gender (H1a) disappears when Earnings Guidance
Disclosure is present (4.896 versus 4.803; t = 0.265; p = 0.791 two-tailed). That is, the gender-
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Point and Range conditions are tabulated separately in Table 3 and graphed in Figure 3.
In addition to my main dependent variable, I ask participants to estimate their own forecast of the company’s next
quarter earnings per share (EPS). This forecast is measured on a slider scale from 3.5 cents per share to 13.5 cents
per share, with $0.10 increments and the midpoint being 8.5 cents per share (labelled “consensus analyst forecast”).
I verify that Investment Willingness is significantly correlated with investors’ EPS forecasts. I find a significant
positive relationship between Investment Willingness and their EPS forecast (0.177; p < 0.001). In addition, I find
that these measures are correlated (Pearson correlation: 0.404; p < 0.001).
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activism heuristic effect that exists in the absence of earnings guidance disclosure appears to
disappear once a CEO discloses optimistic earnings guidance that is incongruent with analyst
forecasts. For participants seeing E&S-focused Activism, I find a significant interaction effect
(F1,355 = 4.579; p = 0.033 two-tailed) and, as with Profitability-focused Activism, I find that the
simple effect of gender (H1b) disappears when Earnings Guidance Disclosure is present (5.197
versus 5.136; t = 0.134; p = 0.893 two-tailed). These results offer some support for H2a, and no
support for H2b, with the evidence supporting an attenuation of the gender-activism heuristic in
the presence of Earnings Guidance Disclosure.20
Follow-up simple-effects tests provide additional insight. Specifically, regarding the
effects of disclosure under Profitability-focused Activism, I find that Earnings Guidance
Disclosure does not increase Investment Willingness within the Male CEO condition (4.594
versus 4.897; t = 0.694; p = 0.489 two-tailed) but does increase Investment Willingness in the
Female CEO condition (3.850 versus 4.803; t = 2.122; p = 0.034 two-tailed). Additionally, under
E&S-focused Activism, I find that Earnings Guidance Disclosure does not significantly increase
Investment Willingness for the Male CEO condition (4.591 versus 5.136; t = 1.230; p = 0.220
two-tailed) but does decrease Investment Willingness in the Female CEO condition (5.984 versus

20

H2b suggests that any changes in Investment Willingness would be a function of changes in perceptions of CEO
credibility. In untabulated analyses, I examine perceptions of CEO credibility and do not find any significant
interaction effects with respect to CEO Gender, Earnings Guidance Disclosure, and Shareholder Activism (all p’s >
0.322 two-tailed), offering further evidence against H2b. I do, however, find a significant main effect for CEO
Gender, where female CEOs are viewed as more credible compared to male CEOs, irrespective of Earnings
Guidance Disclosure and Shareholder Activism (p = 0.003). Additionally, for participants who saw earnings
guidance disclosure, I record participants’ attributions for the disclosure. Specifically, on three different scales, I ask
participants to record their agreement/disagreement with the reason of the disclosure being either “because he/she is
a competent CEO,” “because he/she is a trustworthy CEO,” or “because of the threat of shareholder activism”,
where 0 = “Strongly Disagree”, 10 = “Strongly Agree” and 5 = “Neither Agree nor Disagree”. The attributions of
trustworthiness and competence were strongly correlated (Pearson Correlation = 0.76, p < 0.001; Eigenvalue = 1.76
explains 88 percent of variance; Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.86). As such, I average the scores to form an attribution of
CEO credibility. In untabulated analyses, I find no significant interaction, main, or simple effects of CEO Gender
and Shareholder Activism on either measure of attribution, offering further evidence against H2b.
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5.197; t = 1.792; p = 0.037 two-tailed). These results suggest that disclosure has a stronger
impact on perceptions of female CEOs than male CEOs.
One potential explanation for this finding is the fact that in male-dominated fields, when
females exhibit agentic behavior, they are evaluated more positively compared to females who
exhibit communal behavior (Bloomfield et al., 2021). As it relates to this study, to the extent that
disclosure of earnings guidance is perceived as agentic behavior, this would lead to differences
in investor reactions, depending on the type of activism present. Under this logic, disclosure
from a female CEO would be viewed more positively under more agentic activism (Profitabilityfocused) and more negatively under more communal activism (E&S-focused), compared to when
earnings guidance is not disclosed. For male CEOs, who are already viewed as agentic
(regardless of disclosure), disclosure (or the absence thereof) is less likely to impact Investment
Willingness compared to female CEOs. Another potential explanation for this disclosure effect
stems from the relative disparity of females at the CEO level. Specifically, agentic behavior from
a female CEO could lead to increased investor focus on the disclosure, compared to her
characteristics (e.g., gender). It is possible that there would not be a comparable level of scrutiny
on a male CEO’s disclosure, given the male-dominated nature of CEO positions. Both
explanations are consistent with my findings.
4.2.3. Precision - Test of RQ
To answer my research question and examine the effects of the precision of Earnings
Guidance Disclosure, I compare participants’ Investment Willingness when either a Point
Disclosure or Range Disclosure is given, excluding Disclosure Absent conditions. In untabulated
analyses, I find no significant interaction, main, or simple effects between Point Disclosure and
Range Disclosure (all p’s > 0.394 two-tailed). This finding persists under both Profitability31

focused Activism and E&S-focused Activism. One possible explanation for this finding is that the
investors who were presented with range disclosures focused on the midpoint of the range, as in
Hirst et al. (1999). Alternatively, it is possible that the effect of incongruence in this setting was
sufficiently strong that it outweighed any effects due to the precision of the forecast. As it relates
to this study, I find initial evidence that both types of disclosure are potential sources of
incongruent messaging (when compared to a consensus analyst forecast) and may attenuate the
gender-activism heuristic that exists in Disclosure Absent conditions.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
Through an experiment with nonprofessional investors, I study the interactive effects of
CEO gender, shareholder activism, and earnings guidance disclosure. I find evidence of a
gender-activism heuristic such that under ambiguous situations (e.g., when earnings guidance
disclosure is absent), investors are more likely to determine their investment willingness by
relying on a perceived match between the CEO and the type of activism, where a match is
perceived between male CEOs and more agentic activism (“profitability-focused”), and between
female CEOs and more communal activism (“E&S-focused”). Additionally, I find that this effect
is attenuated in the presence of earnings guidance disclosure that is incongruent with consensus
analyst forecasts, with disclosure largely impacting investment willingness when there is a
female CEO, compared to when there is a male CEO. Finally, I find no differences between
point and range estimates and find that both are capable of attenuating the gender-activism
heuristic that is observed when earnings guidance disclosure is absent.
This study has both theoretical and practical implications. Specifically, this study draws
on role congruity theory and illustrates a scenario in which communal, feminine traits would be
valued over male, agentic traits, and as such contributes to the emerging stream of literature
investigating gender differences in accounting settings (Fanning et al., 2019; Bloomfield et al.,
2021; Friedman, 2019; Cook et al., 2020). More importantly, compared to previous gender
studies looking at role congruity, I identify incongruent messaging as a relatively subtle
motivation for investors to engage in effortful processing and avoid gender-based heuristic
processing, as compared to more overt motivations such as accountability, or having participants
consider consequences/equity norms (Koch et al., 2015). Additionally, the findings of this study
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are consistent with (and offer a behavioral explanation for) recent archival research that finds
analysts’ deviations from management guidance offer value-relevant information to investors
(Louis et al., 2013). Further, while my study uses a shareholder activism setting given the
increased attention on E&S activities, and regulatory interest surrounding activism, my findings
likely extend to the general crisis management literature, to the extent that a crisis is perceived to
be more agentic or communal in nature (Pearson and Clair, 1998). In terms of practical
implications, this study is informative to companies who are debating issuing earnings guidance
disclosure in the presence of shareholder activism, particularly when the CEO is female. Finally,
this study should prove informative to regulators who have expressed concerns about the effect
of shareholder activism on other financial players, particularly nonprofessional investors for
whom the SEC has expressed concern about protecting (Jackson, 2018; SEC, 2020). Specifically,
it differentiates the potential effects of profitability-focused and E&S-focused activism on
prospective investors.
While informative, this study does have limitations. It is possible that the practical
contribution of my findings is limited by the small percentage of female CEOs in the real world.
However, if current trends continue, this percentage will continue to rise in the future, increasing
the relevance of the results to practice. Additionally, anecdotally, there exist female CEOs at
prominent companies (e.g., Carol Tome at UPS, Mary Burra at General Motors). Furthermore, it
is possible that the effect observed for nonprofessional investors does not persist with more
professional investors. However, this is not a foregone conclusion as there is ample empirical
evidence of heuristic processing among professional investors (e.g., Lakonishok, Shleifer, and
Vishny 1992; Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers, 1995; Welch 2000).
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This study presents opportunities for future research. While I examine the perceived
match created by CEO gender and the type of shareholder activism present, future studies could
examine if, holding gender constant (e.g., two male CEOs), perceptions of communality and
agenticism continue to differ and create perceptions of match/mismatch. Second, given the
increasing prevalence of E&S-related activities, it is possible that, in the future, investors will
view E&S activities as a normal course of business and, therefore, more agentic rather than
communal. Additionally, this study focuses on one type of financial disclosure, namely
optimistic earnings guidance. It is unknown whether the attenuation of the gender-activism
heuristic would persist under other types of financial disclosure, specifically ones in which all
messaging is congruent, or ones in which the incongruence is caused by pessimistic forecasts
from management. Further, while my pilot data suggests a relatively high perception of
familiarity with both CEOs, future research could investigate whether the gender-activism
heuristic I document in H1 is jointly affected by investors’ perceptions of familiarity/closeness
with the CEO. Finally, this study examines a situation in which the CEO makes a public
statement addressing the activism indirectly. It is unclear whether these results would persist
when the response is more cooperative in nature, dealing with the activists directly, rather than in
public spheres. My findings suggest that, as instances of shareholder activism continue to
increase, further examination of shareholder activism and its effect on financial markets is
needed.
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Figure 1
H1 Results: Gender-Activism Heuristic – Absent Earnings Guidance
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E&S-focused

Male CEO

Female CEO

Fig. 1 Investment Willingness
Figure 1 reports the standard means for Investment Willingness, by condition. For the manipulation of Shareholder
Activism, I create two conditions as follows: (1) Profitability-focused – in which the nature of the demands is to
increase total earnings per share and (2) E&S-focused – in which the nature of the demands is to become more
environmentally and socially conscious (See Appendix C). For the manipulation of CEO Gender, I vary whether the
CEO is male or female, and include a picture of the CEO. In this figure, I examine Investment Willingness in
conditions where Earnings Guidance Disclosure is absent. I measure participants’ Investment Willingness by asking
them to indicate (1) the Attractiveness of an investment in the company, on an 11-point scale, with “0” labeled “very
unattractive” and “10” labeled “very attractive”, and (2) the Likelihood of Investment in the company, on an 11-point
scale, with “0” labeled “very unlikely” and “10” labeled “very likely”. The two measures are highly correlated
(Pearson Correlation = 0.833, p < 0.001, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.906), and thus I use the average of these two
measures as Investment Willingness.
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Figure 2
H2 Results: Attenuation of Gender-Activism Heuristic
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Fig. 2 Investment Willingness
Figure 2 reports the standard means for Investment Willingness, by condition. For the manipulation of Shareholder
Activism, I create two conditions as follows: (1) Profitability-focused – in which the nature of the demands is to
increase total earnings per share and (2) E&S-focused – in which the nature of the demands is to become more
environmentally and socially conscious (See Appendix C for examples). For the manipulation of CEO Gender, I
vary whether the CEO is male or female, and include a picture of the CEO. Finally, Earnings Guidance Disclosure
is manipulated at three levels: (1) Absent – Management does not issue an earnings forecast, (2) Point –
Management estimates the earnings forecast “to be approximately 9.5 cents”, and (3) Range – Management
estimates the earnings forecast “to be between 6.5 cents and 12.5 cents”. In this figure, I collapse Point and Range
conditions into one condition of “Disclosure Present”. I measure participants’ Investment Willingness by asking
them to indicate (1) the Attractiveness of an investment in the company, on an 11-point scale, with “0” labeled “very
unattractive” and “10” labeled “very attractive”, and (2) the Likelihood of Investment in the company, on an 11-point
scale, with “0” labeled “very unlikely” and “10” labeled “very likely”. The two measures are highly correlated
(Pearson Correlation = 0.833, p < 0.001, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.906), and thus I use the average of these two
measures as Investment Willingness.
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Figure 3
H2/RQ Results: Attenuation of Gender-Activism Heuristic (Point & Range)
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Fig. 3 Investment Willingness
Figure 3 reports the standard means for Investment Willingness, by condition. For the manipulation of Shareholder
Activism, I create two conditions as follows: (1) Profitability-focused – in which the nature of the demands is to
increase total earnings per share and (2) E&S-focused – in which the nature of the demands is to become more
environmentally and socially conscious (See Appendix C for examples). For the manipulation of CEO Gender, I
vary whether the CEO is male or female, and include a picture of the CEO. Finally, Earnings Guidance Disclosure
is manipulated at three levels: (1) Absent – Management does not issue an earnings forecast, (2) Point –
Management estimates the earnings forecast “to be approximately 9.5 cents”, and (3) Range – Management
estimates the earnings forecast “to be between 6.5 cents and 12.5 cents”. I measure participants’ Investment
Willingness by asking them to indicate (1) the Attractiveness of an investment in the company, on an 11-point scale,
with “0” labeled “very unattractive” and “10” labeled “very attractive”, and (2) the Likelihood of Investment in the
company, on an 11-point scale, with “0” labeled “very unlikely” and “10” labeled “very likely”. The two measures
are highly correlated (Pearson Correlation = 0.833, p < 0.001, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.906), and thus I use the average
of these two measures as Investment Willingness.
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Table 1
H1 Results: Gender-Activism Heuristic – Absent Earnings Guidance

PANEL A: Investment Willingness - mean (standard error) [sample size]
Profitability-Focused Activism

E&S-Focused Activism

Male

A: 4.594
(2.073)
[32]

C: 4.591
(2.448)
[33]

Female

B: 3.850
(1.667)
[30]

D: 5.984
(1.851)
[32]

PANEL B: Two-way ANOVA
Source
CEO Gender
Shareholder Activism
CEO Gender × Activism
Error
Total

SS
3.347
36.020
36.212
511.763
586.398

df
1
1
1
123
126

MS
3.347
36.020
36.212
4.161

F
0.819
8.813
8.860

p-value
0.366
0.003
0.003

PANEL C: Simple Effects
Source
[H1a] Simple Effect of Gender under
Profitability-focused activism: (A > B)
[H1b] Simple Effect of Gender under E&Sfocused activism: (D > C)

df
1

t
1.448

p-value
0.075

1

2.778

0.003

Table 1 reports the standard means for Investment Willingness, by condition. For the manipulation of Shareholder
Activism, I create two conditions as follows: (1) Profitability-focused – in which the nature of the demands is to
increase total earnings per share and (2) E&S-focused – in which the nature of the demands is to become more
environmentally and socially conscious (See Appendix C for examples). For the manipulation of CEO Gender, I
vary whether the CEO is male or female, and include a picture of the CEO. In this table, I examine Investment
Willingness in conditions where Earnings Guidance Disclosure is absent. I measure participants’ Investment
Willingness by asking them to indicate (1) the Attractiveness of an investment in the company, on an 11-point scale,
with “0” labeled “very unattractive” and “10” labeled “very attractive”, and (2) the Likelihood of Investment in the
company, on an 11-point scale, with “0” labeled “very unlikely” and “10” labeled “very likely”. The two measures
are highly correlated (Pearson Correlation = 0.833, p < 0.001, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.906), and thus I use the average
of these two measures as Investment Willingness. In Panel B, all p-values are two-tailed. In Panel C, all p-values are
one-tailed given the directional predictions.
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Table 2
H2 Results: Attenuation of Gender-Activism Heuristic

PANEL A: Investment Willingness - mean (standard error) [sample size]

E&S-Focused
Activism

Profitability-Focused
Activism

CEO
Gender

Earnings Guidance Disclosure
Absent
A: 4.594
(2.073)
[32]

Present
C: 4.897
(1.982)
[63]

Female

B: 3.850
(1.667)
[30]

D: 4.803
(2.126)
[61]

Male

E: 4.591
(2.448)
[33]

G: 5.136
(1.665)
[55]

Female

F: 5.984
(1.851)
[32]

H: 5.197
(2.161)
[61]

Male

PANEL B: Three-way ANOVA
Source
CEO Gender
Earnings Guidance Disclosure
Shareholder Activism
CEO Gender × Disclosure
CEO Gender × Activism
Disclosure × Activism
CEO Gender × Disclosure × Activism
Error
Total

SS
1.970
5.330
39.603
2.417
27.201
11.637
20.383
1456.349
1542.037
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df
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
359
366

MS
1.970
5.330
39.603
2.417
27.201
11.637
20.383
4.057

F
0.486
1.314
9.762
0.596
6.705
2.869
5.025

p-value
0.486
0.252
0.002
0.441
0.010
0.091
0.026

Table 2 (Cont.)
PANEL C: Planned Contrasts – Profitability-focused Activism
Source
df
t
Interaction of Gender and Disclosure:
1
1.076
((A – B) > (D – C))
Simple Effect of Gender under Disclosure: (C > D)
1
0.259
Simple Effect of Disclosure for Male CEOs:
1
0.694
(C > A)
Simple Effect of Disclosure for Female CEOs:
1
2.122
(D > B)
Main Effect of Disclosure:
1
2.004
((C+D)/2) > (A+B)/2)
Main Effect of Gender: ((A+C)/2 > (B+D)/2))
1
1.336
PANEL D: Planned Contrasts – E&S-focused Activism
Source
df
Interaction of Gender and Disclosure:
1
((F – E) > (G – H))
Simple Effect of Gender under Disclosure: (H > G)
1
Simple Effect of Disclosure for Male CEOs:
1
(G > E)
Simple Effect of Disclosure for Female CEOs:
1
(F > H)
Main Effect of Disclosure:
1
((G+H)/2) > (E+F)/2)
Main Effect of Gender: ((F+H)/2 > (E+G)/2))
1

p-value
0.300
0.796
0.489
0.034
0.046
0.182

t
2.135

p-value
0.033

0.161
1.230

0.872
0.220

1.792

0.074

0.387

0.698

2.328

0.020

Table 2 reports the standard means for Investment Willingness, by condition. For the manipulation of Shareholder
Activism, I create two conditions as follows: (1) Profitability-focused – in which the nature of the demands is to
increase total earnings per share and (2) E&S-focused – in which the nature of the demands is to become more
environmentally and socially conscious (See Appendix C for examples). For the manipulation of CEO Gender, I
vary whether the CEO is male or female, and include a picture of the CEO. Finally, Earnings Guidance Disclosure
is manipulated at three levels: (1) Absent – Management does not issue an earnings forecast, (2) Point –
Management estimates the earnings forecast “to be approximately 9.5 cents”, and (3) Range – Management
estimates the earnings forecast “to be between 6.5 cents and 12.5 cents”. In this table, I collapse Point and Range
conditions into one condition of “Disclosure Present”. I measure participants’ Investment Willingness by asking
them to indicate (1) the Attractiveness of an investment in the company, on an 11-point scale, with “0” labeled “very
unattractive” and “10” labeled “very attractive”, and (2) the Likelihood of Investment in the company, on an 11-point
scale, with “0” labeled “very unlikely” and “10” labeled “very likely”. The two measures are highly correlated
(Pearson Correlation = 0.833, p < 0.001, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.906), and thus I use the average of these two
measures as Investment Willingness. All p-values are two-tailed.
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Table 3
H2/RQ Results: Attenuation of Gender-Activism Heuristic

E&S-Focused
Activism

Profitability-Focused
Activism

PANEL A: Investment Willingness - mean (standard error) [sample size]
CEO
Earnings Guidance Disclosure
Gender Absent
Male
A: 4.594
(2.073)
[32]

Point
C: 4.883
(1.959)
[30]

Range
E: 4.909
(2.033)
[33]

Female B: 3.850
(1.667)
[30]

D: 5.000
(2.062)
[31]

F: 4.600
(2.207)
[30]

Male

G: 4.591
(2.448)
[33]

I: 5.150
(2.022)
[30]

K: 5.120
(1.139)
[25]

Female H: 5.984
(1.851)
[32]

J: 5.406
(2.464)
[32]

L: 4.966
(1.783)
[29]

PANEL B: Three-way ANOVA
Source
CEO Gender
Earnings Guidance Disclosure
Shareholder Activism
CEO Gender × Disclosure
CEO Gender × Activism
Disclosure × Activism
CEO Gender × Disclosure ×
Activism
Error
Total

SS
0.792
7.949
28.979
5.021
14.988
11.768

df
1
2
1
2
1
2

MS
0.792
3.974
28.979
2.510
14.988
5.884

F
0.194
0.972
7.090
0.614
3.667
1.440

p-value
0.660
0.379
0.008
0.542
0.056
0.238

20.511

2

10.255

2.509

0.083

1450.931
1542.037

355
366

4.087
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Table 3 (Cont.)
PANEL C: Planned Contrast – Profitability-focused Activism
Source
df
t
Interaction of Gender and Disclosure:
1
1.029
((A – B) > ((D + F)/2 – (C + E)/2)
Simple Effect of Gender under Disclosure:
1
0.265
((C+E)/2 > (D+F)/2)
Simple Effect of Disclosure for Male CEOs:
1
0.689
((C+E)/2 > A)
Simple Effect of Disclosure for Female CEOs:
1
2.107
((D+F)/2 > B)
Main Effect of Disclosure:
1
1.990
((C+D+E+F)/4) > (A+B)/2)
Main Effect of Gender: ((A+C+E)/3 >
1
1.052
(B+D+F)/3))
PANEL D: Planned Contrasts – E&S-focused Activism
Source
df
Interaction of Gender and Disclosure:
1
((H – G) > ((I + K)/2 – (J + L)/2)
Simple Effect of Gender under Disclosure:
1
((J+L)/2 > (I+K)/2))
Simple Effect of Disclosure for Male CEOs:
1
((I+K)/2 > G)
Simple Effect of Disclosure for Female CEOs:
1
((J+L)/2 > H)
Main Effect of Disclosure:
1
((I+J+K+L)/4) > (G+H)/2)
Main Effect of Gender: ((G+I+K)/3 >
1
(H+J+L)/3))

p-value
0.304
0.791
0.491
0.036
0.047
0.294

t
2.140

p-value
0.033

0.134

0.893

1.220

0.223

1.809

0.071

0.405

0.685

1.650

0.100

Table 3 reports the standard means for Investment Willingness, by condition. For the manipulation of Shareholder
Activism, I create two conditions as follows: (1) Profitability-focused – in which the nature of the demands is to
increase total earnings per share and (2) E&S-focused – in which the nature of the demands is to become more
environmentally and socially conscious (See Appendix C for examples). For the manipulation of CEO Gender, I
vary whether the CEO is male or female, and include a picture of the CEO. Finally, Earnings Guidance Disclosure
is manipulated at three levels: (1) Absent – Management does not issue an earnings forecast, (2) Point –
Management estimates the earnings forecast “to be approximately 9.5 cents”, and (3) Range – Management
estimates the earnings forecast “to be between 6.5 cents and 12.5 cents”. I measure participants’ Investment
Willingness by asking them to indicate (1) the Attractiveness of an investment in the company, on an 11-point scale,
with “0” labeled “very unattractive” and “10” labeled “very attractive”, and (2) the Likelihood of Investment in the
company, on an 11-point scale, with “0” labeled “very unlikely” and “10” labeled “very likely”. The two measures
are highly correlated (Pearson Correlation = 0.833, p < 0.001, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.906), and thus I use the average
of these two measures as Investment Willingness. All p-values are two-tailed.
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APPENDIX A

REAL-WORLD EXAMPLES OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM
Quotes from Industry/Regulators about Shareholder Activism
“In my judgment, we’re at a pivotal moment in American financial history when corporate elections are
increasingly decided by a handful of exceptionally powerful index fund managers, and what’s clear to me
is that the SEC’s current rules leave investors largely in the dark about how institutional investors are
wielding that considerable authority.” – Robert Jackson Jr.: Commissioner, SEC (12/6/2018)
“If historical trends continue, a handful of giant institutional investors will one day hold voting control of
virtually every large U.S. corporation. Public Policy cannot ignore this growing dominance, and consider
its impact on the financial markets, corporate governance, and regulation. These will be major issues in
the coming era.” – Jack Bogle: Founder, Vanguard (11/29/2018)

Examples of Shareholder Activism:
Corporate Governance-Related:
•
•

•
•

Activist fund Trian Fund launched a campaign against GE (with only 1.5% of GE shares).
Ousted the CEO of GE off the board after 16 years.
Activist fund Third Point took a 1.3% stake in Nestle. Third Point founder Daniel Loeb
demanded major strategic changes in the company’s product portfolio, including a share buyback
program, and selling its large holding in Loreal. Nestle gave in to most of the demands, setting
itself an operating margin target for the first time and accelerating a share buyback program.
Activist fund Elliot Advisers put pressure on Dutch company AkzoNobel, who agreed to appoint
three new directors to its board.
Active Ownership Capital managed to replace top management at drug-maker company Stada.

Sustainability-Related:
•

•

‘Aiming for A’ investor coalition filed resolutions at BP and Shell asking the companies to
disclose more information on how they were adapting to low-carbon transition. Resolutions
became binding after more than 98% of shareholders voted in support.
In 2017, for the first time, some of the largest asset managers (BlackRock, Vanguard, Fidelity,
American Funds) began voting for climate-related shareholder proposals, contributing to historic
levels of support.
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APPENDIX B
EXPERIMENTAL FLOW

Background/Financial
Information

CEO Gender: Male vs.
Female

Shareholder Activism
Shareholder Activism:
Profitability-focused vs.
E&S-focused
Management Statement
Earnings Guidance
Disclosure: None vs. Point
vs. Range

Investment Willingness

Dependent Variable

PEQs & Demographics
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APPENDIX C
MANIPULATION OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM
(E&S-focused Activism vs. Profitability-focused Activism) (Male vs. Female)

As of recently, Zetha Inc. faces a threat of shareholder activism. Main Street Global Advisors, a large
activist hedge fund that holds 5% of the company’s outstanding shares, announced that they would
begin targeting CEO Deborah/Peter Schmidt to enact certain changes to [become more
environmentally and socially conscious/increase total earnings per share]. Listed below are the fund’s
demands:

1) Increased use of sustainable manufacturing processes
2) Increased gender diversity of board members
3) Exclusive purchasing from suppliers who ensure safe, fair, and healthy working conditions
1) Sell off certain slow-growth investments and other assets
2) Decrease excessive compensation of senior management and board members
3) Begin program to repurchase outstanding shares

Main Street Global Advisors claims that if the CEO can meet these demands, it could improve public
perception of the company and drive up the share price. Main Street warned that they would use any
tool available to guarantee that Deborah/Peter Schmidt takes action to meet these demands, including
using proxy voting power to vote against her/his appointment as CEO, talking negatively about the
company with the media, and even liquifying all of its holdings in the company. These measures
collectively would likely have a negative impact on the share price of Zetha Inc.
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APPENDIX D
MANIPULATION OF EARNINGS GUIDANCE DISCLOSURE
(Earnings Guidance Absent vs. Point Estimate vs. Range Estimate) (Male vs. Female) (E&Sfocused Activism vs. Profitability-focused Activism)
A few days later, Zetha Inc. CEO Deborah/Peter Schmidt issued the following statement:

Since my appointment as CEO, we have
been focused on leveraging our skills
and expertise to make Zetha Inc. a
leader in the telecommunications
industry.
We are revising a plan of action to
address the competitive conditions
facing the company but remain
confident in our ability to lead the market in delivering high-quality telecommunication
devices.
We are committed to making [Zetha Inc. a more sustainable, diverse company that
promotes humane working conditions in our suppliers./Zetha Inc. a more streamlined
company that does what it takes to increase earnings per share.]
Taking this under consideration, we are predicting the forecast for third quarter
earnings per share to be (between 6.5 cents and 12.5 cents/approximately 9.5 cents).
Recall that the consensus analyst EPS forecast is:
Consensus Analyst EPS Forecast for Q3 2020
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8.5 ¢

APPENDIX E
CONSENT FORM – ALL CONDITIONS
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APPENDIX F
EXPERIMENTAL CASE:
MAIN STUDY
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Exhibit 1
Instructions
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Exhibit 2.1
Company Background – Male CEO
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Exhibit 2.2
Company Background – Female CEO
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Exhibit 3
Financial Data
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Exhibit 4
Comprehension Check – EPS Forecast
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Exhibit 5
Manipulation of Shareholder Activism

See Appendix B
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Exhibit 6.1
Comprehension Check – Nature of Activism – Male CEO

Exhibit 6.2
Comprehension Check – Nature of Activism – Female CEO
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Exhibit 7
Manipulation of Earnings Guidance Disclosure

See Appendix C
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Exhibit 8
Dependent Variable – Investment Willingness
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Exhibit 9.1
Credibility – Male CEO

Exhibit 9.2
Credibility – Female CEO
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Exhibit 10.1
Earnings Guidance Attribution – Male CEO
Only present in Earnings Guidance Disclosure Conditions (Point/Range)
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Exhibit 10.2
Earnings Guidance Attribution – Female CEO
Only present in Earnings Guidance Disclosure Conditions (Point/Range)
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Exhibit 11
EPS Forecast
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Exhibit 12
Attention Check
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Exhibit 13
Demographics
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Exhibit 14
Demographics (cont.)
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Exhibit 15
Debrief
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Exhibit 16
Response Independence
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Exhibit 17
Conclusion
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APPENDIX G
EXPERIMENTAL CASE:
PILOT STUDY EXCERPTS

69

Exhibit 1
Pilot 1 Excerpt
Male CEO Evaluations: Agentic, Communal, Credible, Attractive, Old
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Exhibit 2
Pilot 1 Excerpt
Female CEO Evaluations: Agentic, Communal, Credible, Attractive, Old
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Exhibit 3
Pilot 2 Excerpt
Male CEO Evaluations: Familiarity, Masculinity/Femininity, & Miscellaneous
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Exhibit 4
Pilot 2 Excerpt
Female CEO Evaluations: Familiarity, Masculinity/Femininity, & Miscellaneous
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